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UNITED NATIONS NORMS ON THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY ASSERTS BINDING LAW ON
THE GLOBAL RULE MAKERS
JULIE CAMPAGNA*

I.

SUMMARY

Last August, the United Nations ("UN") issued legally
binding draft Norms obligating transnational corporations and
other business entities to respect, protect and fulfill human rights
within their respective spheres.
The international business community objects to the Norms
and claims that compliance with international human rights law
should be by choice and only applicable to the extent it desires.
Moreover, the community asserts that nation states, not the UN,
should enforce human rights. It is wrong on all accounts.
Legally, human beings hold their rights not as citizens or
subjects of nation states, but as members of society. Despite the
legal duty to respect, protect and fulfill the intertwined and
interdependent economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights
of their citizens, many nations breach this duty. Moreover, many
of these countries perpetrate human rights violations themselves.
Other countries are so impoverished, or war-torn, or both, to claim
supervening impossibility of performance.
Sovereignty, the
indispensable object for executing their duties, has vanished.
The international society of states delegated the task of
international human rights supervision to the UN in the Charter.
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University of Illinois. J.D., 2003, Chicago Kent College of Law. LL.M.
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Participation and accountability are the bases of the principles put
forth by the Norms.
The decisions and actions of transnational corporations affect
individuals' human rights worldwide. Through their economic
might, transnational corporations established ample participatory
rights in international law. Under its legal authority, the UN set
forth basic duties of accountability under international law.
II. INTRODUCTION

On August 13, 2003, the UN Commission on Human Rights
adopted draft Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to
Human Rights ("Norms").' All fifty-three member nations of the
Commission supported their adoption.! The Norms were not the
UN's first attempt to address the human rights, labor rights and
environmental rights of the world's peoples in a single effort. In
June of 1998, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations
The Compact sets forth nine
Global Compact ("Compact").'
principles derived from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the ILO TripartiteDeclaration of Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work and the Rio Declaration on the Environment
and Development.4 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan introduced
the Compact to world business leaders at the World Economic
Forum on January 31, 1999.' On July 26, 2000, the Compact
commenced its operational phase at UN headquarters in New
York.6 The UN describes the Compact as a network. "At its core
are the Global Compact Office and four UN agencies: the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights; the United Nations
Environment Programme; the International Labour Organization
and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization."'
Unveiling the Global Compact at the World Economic Forum, Mr.

1. Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand Other
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess.,

22d mtg., at Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html

(last

visited June 25, 2004) [hereinafter Norms].
2. Jonathan Birchall, UN Plans to Scrutinise Multinationals, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2003, at Al.

3. U.N.

Global

Compact,

What

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/
2004) [hereinafter Global Compact].

4. U.N.

Global

Compact,

The

Compact?,

at

Default.asp (last visited June

24,

is
Nine

the

Global

Principles, at

http://www.

unglobalcompact.orglPortal/?NavigationTarget=/roles/portal-user/aboutTheG
C/nffnf/theNinePrinciples (last visited July 19, 2004) [hereinafter Nine
Principles].

5. Global Compact, supra note 3.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Annan described its purpose as allying companies with UN
agencies, labor and civil society to support the nine principles!
Compliance is voluntary; international business leaders are
invited to join this international initiative. 9
In addition to the Global Compact, the UN asked
multinational enterprises to follow the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises ("OECD Guidelines"), included in the
OECD Declarationon InternationalInvestment and Multinational
Enterprises.° Member states of the OECD, along with the Slovak
Republic, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, set forth the OECD
Guidelines as recommendations for "standards for responsible
business conduct consistent with applicable laws."" The goal of
the OECD Guidelines is to: "ensure that the operations of
[multinational] enterprises are in harmony with government
policies, to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between
enterprises and the societies in which they operate, to help
improve the foreign investment climate and enhance the
contribution to sustainable development made by multinational
enterprises.""
Compliance with the OECD Guidelines is voluntary and not
legally enforceable. 3
Unlike the Compact and the OECD Guidelines, the Norms
legally bind transnational corporations and other business
enterprises. Under the Norms, these entities are subject to UN
monitoring and verification procedures aside "other international
and national mechanisms already in existence or yet to be
created.""
The international business community virulently opposes the
Norms because of their enforceability. The International Chamber
of Commerce ("ICC") and the International Organisation of
Employers ("JOE") issued a joint statement opposing the Norms
and their "legalistic approach."1" The United States Council for
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 15 (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/

dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (last visited June 24, 2004).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporationsand Other Business Entities with Regard to Human Rights, U.N.
ESCOR, 55th Sess.,
16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003),
available at httpJ/wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/links/commentary-Aug2003.html
[hereinafter Commentary].
15. Joint Views of the IOE and ICC on the Draft Norms on the
Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 55th. Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/NGO/44 (2003), availableat http://www.uscib.org/docs/cr-7-
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International Business, the United States arm of the ICC
("USCIB"), also opposes the Norms.16 It is not clear to the USCIB
how the Norms are binding, nor "what the legal principle involved
would be." 7
III.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF

HUMAN

RIGHTS

Language found in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ("Universal Declaration"), one of the three founding
documents of the UN (along with the UN Charter and the Statute
of the International Court of Justice),9 demonstrates that the
Norms bind transnational corporations as "other organs of
society.""0
The international legal principle involved is rooted in
universal human rights and fundamental freedoms held by every
human being. These rights and freedoms include economic, social
and cultural rights,2' as well as the right to life, freedom from
slavery in all its forms and freedom from servitude and forced or
compulsory labor.22 The "interconnection and independence" of the
right to civil and political freedoms of inviolable economic, social
and cultural rights is fundamental to international human rights
law since the UN General Assembly initially declared them so in
1950.23 The Universal Declaration, the most translated document
in the world,24 has become the "yardstick by which to measure the
degree of respect for, and compliance with international human
rights standards."2" "It has set the direction for all subsequent
work in the field of human rights and has provided the basic
philosophy for many legally binding international instruments

30-02.pdf (last visited July 8, 2004) [hereinafter Joint Views].
16. Birchall, supra note 2.
17. Id.
18. UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Although strict
positivists do not consider this binding international law, the Universal
Declaration has been codified and confirmed by the twin covenants, the CESC,
infra note 21, and the CCPR, infra note 22.
19. LoRI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
588-89 (4th ed. 2001).
20. Universal Declaration,supra note 18.
21. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
opened for signatureDec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CESC].
22. International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter CCPRI.
23. G.A. Res. 421 (V), 5th Sess., 317th plen. mtg., sect. E, U.N. Doc
A/RES/427(V), (1950).
24. See generally Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, The
InternationalBill of Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm (last visited June 24, 2004)
[hereinafter Fact Sheet].
25. Id.
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designed to protect the rights and freedoms which it proclaims."26
Though strict positivists do not consider the Universal
Declaration legally binding,27 it is undisputed that the twin human

rights covenants, the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights" ("CESC") and the InternationalCovenant on
Civil and Political Rights29 ("CCPR"), constitute binding
international law upon and between those states that adopted
them." One hundred forty-eight nation states have ratified the

26. Id.
27. See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

50-52 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the legal weight of UN Resolutions). UN
Resolutions are often considered to be "evidence" of the development of
international law. Id. at 51. They are sometimes regarded as a form of "soft"
international law, neither legally binding nor legally insignificant. Id. at 5152. "In time (they) may harden into customary international law." Id. at 52.
But see Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that
"the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 'no longer fits into the dichotomy
of 'binding treaty' against 'non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an
authoritative statement of the international community") (citing E. SCHWELB,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 70 (1964)).

The court

went on to observe that not only the Universal Declaration, but all United
Nations declarations "create an expectation of adherence, and 'insofar as the
expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by
custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States.'" Id.
(citing U.N. ESCOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 8, at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1/610
(1962)). See, e.g., DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 19 (discussing the legal effect
of General Assembly resolutions and decisions and distinguishing between
those resolutions that deal with specific factual situations and then express or
imply general legal prescription for states or which are addressed to particular
states and imply that the recommended or required conduct is conduct
required of all states, and those resolutions that express general rules of
conduct for states). Approximately 8,000 resolutions were adopted between
1946 and 2000. Id. at 145-46. Fewer than 100 of them, however, express
general rules of conduct for states. Id. It is this small subset that "may be
considered by governments and by courts or arbitral tribunals as evidence of
international custom or as expressing (and evidencing) a general principle of
law." Id. at 146. They "may also serve to set forth principles for a future
treaty." Id. See, e.g., Fact Sheet, supra note 24 (discussing the role of the
Universal Declaration as a basis for action as well as a basis for "nearly all the
international human rights adopted by United Nations bodies since 1948")
Moreover, the Universal Declaration has also served as a basis for
international human rights instruments "adopted outside the United Nations
system." Id. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950), the
Charter of the Organization of African Unity (adopted at Addis Ababa in
1963), and the American Convention on Human Rights (signed at San Jos6,
Costa Rica in 1969), for example, either refer to the Universal Declaration and
include its purposes in the purposes of the regional treaty, or adopt specific
language from the Preamble to the Universal Declaration, or both. Id.
28. CESC, supra note 21.
29. CCPR, supra note 22.
30. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
38(1)(a), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJStatute].
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CESC, and one hundred fifty-one states have ratified the CCPR.3"
Moreover, states that signed, but did not ratify one or both of the
covenants, are obligated, under international law, "to refrain from3
1
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of [the] treaty."
The CESC and the CCPR, annexed to the Universal Declaration
and both signed on the same day,33 codify the principles the
Universal Declaration sets forth.34 The Universal Declaration,
with the CESC, the CCPR and the two optional protocols to the
CCPR, form the International Bill of Rights. Because it marks the
"conscious acquisition of human dignity and worth," the Universal
Declaration is also called the Magna Carta of international human
rights law. 5
Article 28 of the CCPR establishes the Human Rights
Committee.36 The contracting states bound themselves and each
other to "submit reports on the measures they have adopted which
give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress
made in the enjoyment of those rights."37 The plain language of
the CCPR demonstrates that the international community of
states recognized and looked to the supervisory function of the
United Nations as a guardian of international human rights from

31. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Development of the
Human Rights Treaty System, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
intlist.htm (last visited June 24, 2004).
32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 18 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. See,
e.g., JANIS, supra note 27, at 17 (explaining that the Vienna Convention is
"largely, though not entirely, a codification of the existing customary
international law of treaties"). The International Law Commission sees the
Vienna Convention as "both a codification and a progressive development of
international law." Id. (citing 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 177.) The repeated
position of the International Court of Justice is that the Vienna Convention
"may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary
law" on the interpretation of treaties. Id. at 17 (citing Thirlway, The Law and
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960-1989 (Part Three), 62
BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1991)). The United States is not a party to the
Vienna Convention, but the U.S. State Department does recognize it as "the
authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." Id. (citing S. EXEC.
DOC., 92-L, at 1 (1991)). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States "accepts the Vienna Convention as, in general, constituting
a codification of the customary international law governing international
agreements." Id. (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 145 (1987)).

33. The CESR is annexed to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2200. G.A.
Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 490, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966). The CCPR is also annexed to U.N General Assembly Resolution 2200.
G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52 U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
34. FactSheet, supra note 25.
35. Id.
36. CCPR, supra note 22, at art. 40(1).
37. Id.
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the start. Moreover, the first Optional Protocol to the CCPRm
enables the Human Rights Committee "to receive and consider
communications from individuals claiming to be victims of
violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.9
Despite the uncertainty expressed by the international
business community,40 it is patently clear that human beings have
recourse to the United Nations, and not only to their nation states,
since the formal, treaty-bound inception of international human
rights law. At the same time, there is an undeniable tension, or
"disconnect," between human rights theory and international
human rights law. "While human rights theory supports the
claims of rights holders against all others, international human
rights law treats the state as the principal threat to individual
freedom and well-being."'
As is frequently the case, history helps explain the current
situation. Civil and political human rights rest on a post-World
War II paradigm under which the state and its agents have the
duty to respect and ensure rights .42
"Real, full-blown
internationalization of human rights came in the wake of Hitler
and World War II'
On the other hand, economic and social
rights actually precede the civil and political as a world issue. 4
"Efforts to establish international protection for human rights can
be traced to the surge of globalization and international markets
that occurred at the end of the 19th century." 5
International labor standards were needed "to avoid
competitive distortions and enhance the protection of the
fundamental rights of workers" because of the industrial
revolution." The International Labour Organization ("ILO") was
created to address these rights and requirements and to develop
international labor standards.47
"Unlike all the subsequent
international organizations, the ILO has engaged all the relevant
actors," that is, government, employers and employees, "in its
operations from the beginning."'
38. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59 U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302
[hereinafter First OptionalProtocol].
39. First Optional Protocol, supra note 38, at art. 1. See also Fact Sheet,
supra note 25.
40. See Birchall, supra note 2. See also Joint Views, supra note 15.
41. Dinah Shelton, ProtectingHuman Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 281-82 (2002).
42. Id. at 282.
43. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 19, at 588.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Shelton, supra note 41, at 280.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 281.
Id.
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The IOE and ICC, however, "strongly believe that the
establishment of the legal framework for protecting human rights
and its enforcement is a task for national governments," 9 and in
that assertion, they are correct. Human rights protection and
enforcement are tasks that bind all states who are parties to
human rights covenants. Both the Limburg Principles on the
Implementation of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, ("Limburg Principles")'° and the Maastricht
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
51 provide that a state's failure to comply
("MaastrichtGuidelines")

49. Joint Views, supra note 15.
50. The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess.,
Agenda item 3, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1987/17 (1987) [hereinafter Limburg
Principles].
A group of distinguished experts in international law, convened by the
International Commission of Jurists, the Faculty of Law of the
University of Limburg (Maastricht, the Netherlands) and the Urban
Morgan Institute for Human Rights, University of Cincinnati (Ohio,
United States of America), met in Maastricht on 2-6 June 1986 to
consider the nature and scope of the obligations of States parties to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
consideration of States parties Reports by the newly constituted
ECOSOC Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
international co-operation under Part IV of the Covenant.
The 29 Participants came from Australia, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Senegal,
Spain, United Kingdom, United States of America, Yugoslavia, the
United Nations Centre for Human Rights, the International Labour
Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization
the
Commonwealth
Secretariat, and the sponsoring
(WHO),
organizations. Four of the participants were members of the ECOSOC
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Id. at Introduction.
51. The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc
E/C. 12/2000/13 (2000) [hereinafter MaastrichtGuidelines].
On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Limburg Principles... a
group of more than thirty experts met in Maastricht from 22-26 January
1997 at the invitation of the International Commission of Jurists
(Geneva, Switzerland), the Urban Morgan Institute on Human Rights
(Cincinnati, Ohio, USA) and the Centre for Human Rights of the Faculty
of Law of Maastricht University (the Netherlands). The objective of this
meeting was to elaborate on the Limburg Principles as regards the
nature and scope of violations of economic, social and cultural rights and
appropriate responses and remedies.
The participants unanimously agreed on the Maastricht guidelines
which they understand to reflect the evolution of international law since
1986.
Id. at Introduction.

20041
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with its legal obligation under the CESC violates the CESC under
international law.52 The Limburg Principles and the Maastricht
Guidelines are international legal instruments and are "subsidiary
means" to determine the rule of international law. 3
Most nation states are parties to binding international
treaties on human rights.5' These treaties are all sources of
binding international law' as well as sources, or certainly
52. Limburg Principles, supra note 50, at art. 70; Maastricht Guidelines,
supra note 51, at arts. 4-5.
53. "[Judicial decisions and the teaching of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations [are] a subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law." CJS Statute, art. 38(d), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
54. With the additions of Switzerland and East Timor, there are now 191
member states in the UN. United Nations, List of Member States, availableat
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (updated Apr. 24, 2003). One
hundred forty-eight countries have ratified the CESC and 151 countries have
ratified the CESC's "twin" human rights covenant, the CCPR. OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
11 (2004), available at http'/www.unhchr-ch/pdf/report.pdf. (updated June 9,
2004) [hereinafter STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS]. There are 133 state parties to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12,
One hundred fifty-six
1951); STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS, supra, at 11.
countries have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,
opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
[hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention]; STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS,
supra, at 11. One hundred sixty-seven countries have ratified the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations Against Women.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations Against
Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
CEDAW]; STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS, supra, at 11. There are 127 state parties
to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS, supra, at 11. One
hundred ninety-two states are parties to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter CRC]; STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS, supra, at
11. Even the United States, which has not ratified the CRC has ratified the
CRC's two optional protocols: the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child
Pornography and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
STATUS OF
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict;
RATIFICATIONS, supra, at 11; Mark E. Wojcik et al., International Human
Rights, 37 INTL. LAW. 597, 600 (2003). Finally, on December 10, 2002, the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families received the required twentieth
ratification, entering into force on July 1, 2003. G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR,
45th Sess, 69th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (1990); Wojcik et al., supra, at
600.
55. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1)(a), 59 Stat. 1055-1060.
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evidence, of customary international law.' When condemned by
the international community, states violating treaty-recognized
international human rights deny the violation, thereby recognizing
S 57
their own actions as either contravening general state practice, or
customary international law," or being inconsistent with the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.59
The sheer number of human rights conventions and the
contracting state parties thereto demonstrate the international
community's overwhelming endorsement of human rights. Most of
these international agreements address nation states and require
national governments to establish and enforce legal frameworks
for the protection of human rights.5 Despite the emphasis on
state responsibility, however, "international human rights
instruments continue to recognize human rights that are violated
predominantly by non-state actors, for example, freedom from
slavery and forced labor." 1
The fundamental question in
international human rights law today is "whether a human rights
system premised on state responsibility to respect human rights
can be effective in a globalized world." 2
Transnational corporations are wrong to presume that nation
states are the only legal bodies capable of enforcing human
rights.'
It is true that the U.N. Charter "did not create
institutions to enforce international law,"64 and that "the Charter
itself was not conceived to include a code of international law."65
The one exception to this "design to establish a new world order
after the Second World War' also happens to be "the most
important norm of 20th century law."67 The Charter created
specific institutions to enforce international law "in respect of the
prohibition of the use of force related to threats to international
peace and security.'
In an international legal order where "the enjoyment of civic
and political freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights
are interconnected and interdependent," ' there can be no peace or
56. JANIS, supra note 27, at 51.
57. Marco Simons, The Emergence of a Norm Against Arbitrary Forced
Relocation, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 95, 97 (2002).
58. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1)(g), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060..
59. Id. at art. 38(1)(c).
60. Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations
and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 71 (2002).
61. Shelton, supra note 41, at 282.
62. Id. at 274.
63. Joint Views, supra note 15.
64. DAMROSCH, supra note 19, at 29.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Universal Declaration,supra note 18.
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security when "the poorest fifth of the world's population is
receiving 1.4% of the global income and the richest fifth 85%.""'
The aims of the U.N. Charter are to "promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom."7' Yet, the gap between
the world's rich and poor doubled in the last three decades of the
20th century.72 The impact of this income disparity is so dramatic
as to render "the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights
illusory for a significant portion of the planet."73 With peace and
security under an increasing, decade-by-decade threat, the
question is not whether the United Nations can act. It must act
under its full legal powers "to employ international machinery for
the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all
peoples"74 under the mandate put forth by "the representatives
assembled in the city of San Francisco, who... exhibited their full
powers"7' when agreeing to the U.N. Charter, thereby
"establish[ing] an international organization to be known as the
United Nations."76
The Washington consensus, under the legal authority of the
IMF and the World Bank, managed to successfully propose global
income redistribution.7 The Economic and Social Council has not
done so. 8 Instead, it exercises its charter-based authority to
promote "progressive measures" 7 9 in order "to secure universal"'
and particularly effective8 "recognition and observance"8 of the
universal right of self-determination83 under international law

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

MaastrichtGuidelines, supra note 51, art. 1.
U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
Maastricht Guidelines, supranote 51, art. 1.
Id. (emphasis added).
U.N. CHARTER pmbl.

75. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
76. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
77. See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 41, at 288-94 (discussing the Washington
Consensus methods of structural adjustment and economic liberalization in
the 1980s and 1990s resulting in the relinquishing, by sovereign states, of
their legal duty to promote, fulfill, and ensure the fulfillment of their citizens'
right to health, education, housing and other international human rights
guaranteed by the International Bill of Rights).
78. See id.
79. Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl. 12. See Universal Declaration, supra

note 18, at Proclamation.
80. Id.
81. Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl. 2. The addition of the adjective
"effective" is one of the few distinctions between the language of the Preamble

to the Norms and the Proclamation of the Universal Declaration, which
otherwise mirror each other nearly verbatim. The United Nations is not
changing the law or creating the law by adopting these Norms; it is trying to

get something done.
82. Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl. 2 (emphasis added).
Declaration,supra note 18, at Proclamation.

See Universal

83. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 1(1); CCPR, supra note 22 at art. 1(1).
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(italics added). Not only is everyone entitled to a social and
international order to realize these rights,' but members of society
have duties to the community,' which is the only place available
to freely and fully develop one's personality,' or one's legal power
to act. The only limitations the United Nations imposes on
transnational corporations' rights to act are those already imposed
by international law, which are limited "solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public
order and the general welfare in a democratic society.""
The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations has
not acted ultra vires because it has neither promulgated nor
sought enforcement of, new international law on human rights,
employment procedures or environmental practices,' i.e. the law
governing "the core business practices and operations" of
transnational corporations.89 Instead, the Council acknowledges
and recognizes the law set forth by the international community of
states 9o as well as the non-binding evidentiary instruments, the
OECD Guidelines9 ' and the Global Compact,92 and announced an
implementation and verification plan, a tool or standard to
measure the legal compliance of transnational corporations. 2
As explained above, states recognize the supervisory function
of the United Nations as a guardian of individual rights in the
fundamental human rights covenants.
Moreover, and more
critically, human beings do not hold their human rights and
fundamental freedoms as citizens of nation states.9 They hold
these rights as "members of society" and are entitled to have these
rights realized through both national effort and international
cooperation.95 "Achiev[ing] international co-operation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character and [ ] promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all" is, of
course, one of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.'

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

UniversalDeclaration,supra note 18, at art. 28.
Id. at art. 29(1).
Id.
Id. at art. 29(2).
DAMROSCH, supra note 19, at 27.
Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl. 11.
Id. at pmbl. %$3-5.
Id. at pmbl. 6.

92. Id. at pmbl. 7.
93. Id. at pmbl. 12.
94. Universal Declaration,supra note 18, at art. 22.

95. Id.
96. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
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IV. UNITED NATIONS SUPERVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Both the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights recognize human rights. "Initial
recognition [of the existence of human rights] was sufficient to
initiate development of human rights law and the process of
international organizational supervision of those rights." 7 Since
that initial recognition, the United Nations has structured its
supervision of human rights law recognition pursuant to and in
furtherance of the world community's authorization to do so under
Article 55 of the Charter.98 Located in Chapter IX, International
Economic and Social Co-operation [sic], Article 55 reiterates the
relationship of equal rights and self-determination of peoples to
economic stability and well being and world peace.' To that end,
the world agreed to delegate to the U.N. the tasks of promoting
higher standards of living;'00 of solving international economic,
social, health and related problems;1' and of upholding "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion. " °" In so doing, the United Nations is fulfilling the
determination of the international community to "promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." 3 One of
the ways the peoples of the United Nations decided to implement
this progress and these standards is to "employ international
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social
advancement of all peoples."'
By supervising transnational
corporations and their adherence to international human rights
law through the employment of its organizational machinery, the
UN carries out the stated principles agreed to by the international
community. 0 '
The Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC"), under whose
authority the Norms were issued,"° is one of the six principal

97. Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled
Towards a People-Centered TransnationalLegal Order?, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L &
POLVY 1, 3 (1993).
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
100. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para a.
101. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para b.
102. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para c.
103. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
104. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para c.
105. The third of the four purposes of the United Nations is "to achieve
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic,
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para.
3.
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 62.
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organs of the United Nations, along with the Security Council, the
General Assembly and the International Court of Justice. °7
ECOSOC, whose Charter-determined membership grew from
eighteen original members to its current fifty-four member
composition,"8 "coordinates the work of the 14 UN specialized
agencies,
10 functional
commissions and five regional
commissions.""
The Charter also allows for the existence of
specialized agencies."' Intergovernmental agreements establish
each of these specialized agencies, which have "wide international
responsibilities... in economic, social, cultural, educational, health
and related fields.""'
One of the functional commissions
coordinated by ECOSOC, in turn, is the Commission on Human
Rights."' Each year, the Commission meets for six weeks, with
over 3,000 delegates, including member states, observer states,
and non-governmental organizations, in attendance."'
These
international actions by international parties arising out of
international conventions and agreements acknowledge and
develop international law, under whose authority each human
being holds human rights.
The international business community believes they should
not be subject to the same UN enforcement procedures that until
now, applied only to nation states."' Again, they are mistaken.
[Tihe norms embedded in [international human rights] agreements
bind the behavior of private individuals and corporations alike.
International law has never been limited to regulating state
behavior. Over the past fifty years, the international community
has moved decisively to expand not only the rights of non-state
actors, but their responsibilities as well."'
As recognized by the Norms and all the international
conventions on human rights, "states have the primary
responsibility to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure
respect of and protect human rights.""6
Nonetheless, every
individual and "every organ of society" also is bound, as
107. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, para. 1.
108. U.N. CHARTER art. 61, para. 1.
109. UN
Econ.
&
Soc. Council,

What

http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecosoc/about.htm

ECOSOC

Does,

at

(last visited June 22,

2004) [hereinafter ECOSOCI.
110. U.N. CHARTER art. 57, para 1.
111. U.N. CHARTER art. 57, para 1.
112. ECOSOC, supra note 109.
113. UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, About the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protectionof Human
Rights, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/sc.htm

2004).
114. Birchall, supra note 2.
115. Stephens, supra note 60, at 71.
116. Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl. 3.

(last visited July 5,
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proclaimed by the Universal Declaration, to promote respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms and to "secure their
universal and effective recognition and observance.""7
This
language proclaims that human rights and fundamental freedoms
are "a common standard of achievement" applicable to all in the
international order." 8
Under international law, treaty terms are interpreted in good
faith, using the ordinary meaning of the terms in their context, in
light of the treaty's object and purpose. "9 The Charter and
Universal Declaration were drafted in the context of a world in the
ruins of World War II. The "Peoples of the United Nations"
concerned themselves primarily with states.'
The object and
purpose of the instruments sought to confirm the worth and
dignity of the human person, as well as that person's fundamental
human rights, whether male or female."'
Promoting social
progress and better standards of life; employing international
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social
advancement of all peoples;" achieving international cooperation
in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural
or humanitarian character; and promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion were
equally important aims."
Human rights were proclaimed "a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.""'4
It was, and remains, the duty of every individual and organ of
society 1to
secure the universal recognition and observance of these
5
rights. "
The object and purpose of the founding documents of the
United Nations, the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration
have not changed. "Since 1948 [the Universal Declaration] has
been and rightly continues to be the most important far-reaching
of all United Nations declarations, and a fundamental source of
inspiration for national and international efforts to promote and
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms." 8 Instead, the
context for the term "every organ of society" is what evolved.
International law equally well establishes that treaty terms and
provisions are not static; they must evolve and adapt to the
117. Universal Declaration,supra note 18, at proclamation.
118. Id. See Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl. 2 (recalling and restating this
common international standard).
119. Vienna Convention, supra note 32, at art. 31(1).
120. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
121. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
122. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
123. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
124. Universal Declaration,supra note 18, at proclamation.
125. Id.
126. Fact Sheet, supra note 24.
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emerging norms of international law.'27 "The law of nations is
dynamic, rather than static."128
By the early 1970s, "the total revenue of the eight largest
multinational and multi-corporate networks... was already some
$118 billion, a monetary mass identical to the global budget
expenses of six European member states together."129 Today
65,000 transnational corporations worldwide operate in two or
more jurisdictions. 130 These 65,000 transnational corporations
have 690,000 foreign affiliates. Currently, 51 of the 100 largest
economies are corporations; 49 are countries.'
"The largest
fifteen corporations have revenues greater than all but thirteen
nations." 32
Only seven national economies are larger than
General Motors.' "Corporations have grown to a level of economic
power that dwarfs most nation states."34
While transnational corporations expanded their economic
strength and presence, the role of the nation state in providing for
the general welfare of its citizens and people within its borders
diminished. 3 '
A trend developed post-Cold War where all regions of the
world reduced the role of the state and began relying on the
market to resolve the problems of human welfare. This typifies
the response to conditions generated by international and national
financial markets and institutions seeking investments from
multinational enterprises
with wealth and power that exceeds that
36
of many states.
The "Washington Consensus methods
of structural
adjustment and economic liberalization.... applied in the 1980s
and early 1990s to the macroeconomic policies of developing
countries ,"137 accelerated this reduced participation by nation
states in fulfilling the essential economic and social human rights
of their citizens. "The Washington Consensus privileged market
127. Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Czech Rep.),
1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
128. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370 (E.D. La.
1997) (citing Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980)).
129. Jose Engracia Antunes, The Liability of Polycorporate Enterprises, 13
CONN. J. INT'L L. 197, 203 (1999).
130. Peter Utting, The Global Compact: Why All the Fuss?, UN CHRON. Jan.
2003,
at
65,
available
at
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2003/issuel/0103p65.html.
131. Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Global
Corporate Power, CORPORATE WATCH, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/

socecon/tncs/top200.htm (last visited June 24, 2004).
132. Stephens, supra note 60, at 57.

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Maastricht Guidelines,supra note 51, at art. 2.

136. Id.
137. Shelton, supra note 41, at 290.
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forces, and the [World] Bank followed by promoting privatization
programs that took the state out of health, education and
housing."'38 According to the UN-appointed independent expert,
structural adjustments imposed by the IMF and the World Bank
in an effort to improve conditions for international investors
impacted states to the point that "countries have ceded their right
to independently determine their country's development
priorities."'39 This is, of course, a violation of the "Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of international law" as
proclaimed in the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, under which nation states "have the sovereign right
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and development policies."4 ' When their nation
states bargained away their legal duty to respect, promote and
fulfill them, citizens of these countries did not lose their
fundamental rights to adequate housing, 4 the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health' or their universal right
to at least a primary education" as guaranteed by the CESC.
When governments trade away the sovereign power to protect and
fulfill the human rights of their citizens and subjects, whether
under duress or not, an insistence that these very governments
remain the sole enforcer of human rights is spurious and
disdainful.
Under
the principle
of participation,
transnational
corporations must be obligated to promote and respect these
citizens' rights.'" This is because they intervened, or legal entities
such as the IMF and the World Bank intervened on their behalf, in
the affairs of other states.'
The principle of participation
"establishes a duty of every state or group that seeks to intervene
in the affairs of any other state or group, to obtain authorization
for its actions through a decision-making mechanism in which all
interested parties have the right to participate.""
Because of this worldwide evolution, or erosion, of state
sovereignty in both the developing and the least-developed

138. Id.
139. Id. at 298.
140. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, RIO DECLARATION ON

ENVIRONMENT

AND

DEVELOPMENT

at

Principle

2,

U.N.

Doc.

A/CONF.151I5/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 and corrigendum (1992)
[hereinafter RIO DECLARATION].
The Rio Declaration is one of the three
fundamental human rights doctrines framing the UN Global Compact. Global
Compact, supra note 3.
141. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 12.
142. Id. at art. 13.
143. Id. at art. 14.
144. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 97, at 24.
145. Shelton, supra note 41, at 297-98.
146. Id. (emphasisadded).
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countries, "it is no longer taken for granted that the realization of
economic, social and cultural rights depends significantly on action
by the state."47 Moreover, the Maastricht Guidelines recognize
that not only states, but "entities insufficiently regulated by
States" are capable of violating economic, social and cultural
rights.'8 By the same token,
there have also been significant legal developments enhancing
economic, social and cultural rights since 1986 [i.e. since the
Limburg Principles], including emerging jurisprudence of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
adoption of instruments, such as the revised European Social
Charter of 1996 and the Additional protocol to the European
Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints, and the
San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic Social and Cultural Rights of 1988.149
Between 1992 and 1996, seven UN conferences took place where
world governments
firmly committed to human rights
development."' By determining that transnational corporations
are legally bound to respect, protect and ensure the human rights
of people whose lives they affect worldwide, the United Nations
has done no more than set forth international law as it has
evolved, since the end of the Second World War, and particularly,
since the end of the Cold War.
Transnational corporations benefited greatly from the
assertion of their economic and legal rights and freedoms in the
international community.
Indeed, the sales pitch given to
businesses to join the ICC, the IOE or the USCIB is the proven
ability to influence international business policy and regulation.'
In return for membership dues, businesses have their interests
represented "directly to U.S. policy makers and officials in the
United Nations, European Union, and a host of other governments
and groups.""2
Transnational corporations need to keep in mind that
human rights law not only potentially imposes duties on non-state
economic actors, it guarantees rights essential for the furtherance of
globalization. It protects the right to property, including intellectual
property, freedom of expression and communications across
147. MaastrichtGuidelines,supra note 51, at art 2.
148. Id. at art. 14.
149. Id. at art. 3.
150. Id.

151. See Joint Views, supra note 15. See also U.S. COUNCIL FOR INT'L Bus.,
CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY (Dec.
2002), available at

ADVANCING

http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentlD=2573 (last visited Aug. 10, 2004)
[hereinafter CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY].

152. See U.S. COUNCIL FOR INT'L Bus., Giving Business a Seat at the Table
(2001), available at http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentlD=706
(last
visited Aug. 10, 2004) [hereinafter A SEAT AT THE TABLE].
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boundaries, due process for contractual or other business disputes
and a remedy before an independent tribunal when rights are
violated. Furthermore, rule of law is an essential pre-requisite to
the long-term conduct of trade and investment.1"
Rather than restricting businesses, the Norms actually benefit
businesses by addressing the classic "free-rider" problem.
As
Robert Lake, head of socially responsible investment at Henderson
Global Investors in London told the Financial Times: "Seen in a
competitive context, a monitoring mechanism can help overcome
the 'free-rider' problem, where many companies are reluctant to
take action for fear that their competitors may not."154
Transnational corporations participate in the international
economic arena and are "directly affected by the decisions taken"
by international legal bodies.'
As actors and participators, these
private global economies believe they "should be able to participate
in the formulation of these decisions."'
These "private actors ...
have at least as much power as the sovereign state. They are able
to use their power to influence the decisions and policies of the
individual nation-state in the domestic realm and of the
community of states in the international arena."157 Because their
actions affect the lives of human beings worldwide, they must be
accountable to these affected individuals. "The identity of those to
be held accountable depends only upon who actually has the power
to make and implement decisions."" Law and equity require that
"all affected parties should be assured of meaningful participation
in the fora in which decisions are made."5 9
The actions of transnational corporations and governments
today are patently intertwined and interdependent. A good faith
reading leaves no doubt that transnational corporations have
evolved into duty-bearing "other organs of society."
"Every
individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no company,
no market, no cyberspace. The Universal Declaration applies to
them all.""
Thus, transnational corporations cannot "choose"
whether
to honor or breach
the universal,
indivisible,
interdependent and interrelated human rights held by all people
wherever they invest their funds and resources.'
These rights

153. Shelton, supra note 41, at 286-87.
154. Birchall, supra note 2.
155. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 97, at 22.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 24.
159. Id.
160. Stephens, supra note 60, at 77.
161. This language, reiterated in the Norms, was first adopted by the
General Assembly in 1950, when it declared that "the enjoyment of civic and
political freedoms of economic, social, and cultural rights are interconnected
and interdependent." Fact Sheet, supra note 24 (emphasis added). The
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include, as established by international law, "the right to
development, which entitles every human person and all peoples
to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural
and political development."' 2 Therefore, the right to development
is not merely an investor's or a government's right, because they
are not the sole parties participating in and contributing to the
development. The right to development entails a straightforward
right to the fruits of one's labors.
V.

FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS OF THE BUSINESS EXEMPTION

In their Joint Statement, the ICC and the IOE claim that one
of the fundamental flaws of the Norms is that they include
assertions of company obligations in dubious contexts.'" As shown
above, however, the human rights "context" is not at all dubious.
That human rights belong to each and every individual, and not to
the State, is well established." It is further established that "[aill
M

interconnection and interdependence of these human rights were the reason
why the General Assembly requested that the Human Rights Commission
draft two covenants on human rights: one setting forth economic, social and
cultural rights, and the other civil and political rights which would contain as
many similar provisions as possible, and both of which would provide that "all
peoples have the right of self-determination." Id. The interconnectedness of
these rights has been re-asserted and re-affirmed in other legally binding
human rights conventions as well as proclamations, such as the Proclamation
of Teheran of 1966. Id. See Limburg Principles, supra note 50, at art. 3
(listing other important international legal instruments reiterating this
interconnectedness). See also Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 51, at art. 4
(restating the interconnection and interdependence of human rights).
The Maastricht Guidelines specifically recalled the 10th anniversary of the
Limburg Principles and declared that the disparities between the increased
gap of the world's rich and poor had rendered enjoyment of economic, social
and cultural rights "illusory for a significant portion of humanity." Id. at
Introduction, art. 2. Whereas the Limburg Principles made it clear that states
were in violation of both domestic and international law when their people
were denied these fundamental human rights (LimburgPrinciples,supra note
50, at art. 10), the Maastricht Guidelines further establish that these rights
may also be violated by "other entities insufficiently regulated by States."
Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 51, at art. 18. The Maastricht Guidelines
also provide remedies and reparations for any person or group victimized by a
violation of these rights. Id. at arts. 22-23. Appropriate remedies should be
available at both national and international levels. Id. at art. 22. Under the
Maastricht Guidelines, adequate reparation can be in the form of "restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition."
Id. at art. 23.
162. Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl. 13.
163. Joint Views, supra note 15.
164. One of the aims resolved in the Preamble of the United Nations Charter
is to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women...." U.N. CHARTER
pmbl.
See Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 2 in particular, under which
"[elveryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
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are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law."16 Every person
possesses the right to a remedy; this is universally recognized."
"Nothing is relevant to or required for the enjoyment of one's
interdependent and intertwined human rights but one's humanity.
Transnational corporations often find themselves directly and
indirectly faced with issues involving the human rights defined in
the Universal Declaration." 7
There are twenty-three Norms divided into eight categories
including general obligations of transnational corporations "to
promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and
protect human rights recognized in international law as well as
national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous
peoples and other vulnerable groups."" Other categories provide
for the right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory
treatment;1 69 the right to security of persons; 76 the rights of
workers;.7' respect for sovereignty and human rights; 72 obligations
with regard to consumer protection; 73 obligations with regard to
environmental
protection; 7 4
general76
provisions
of
7
a definition section.1
and
'
implementation;.
The Commentary to the Norms explicates each section in
great detail, and references instruments and norms of
international law that govern specific categorical rights or
declaration, without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status." Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on
the basis of "the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country
or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, nonself-governing or under any other limitation or sovereignty." Id. These rights
are endorsed and confirmed throughout international human rights
instruments, including the twin covenants, the CESC and the CCPR. CESC,
supra note 21, at art. 2(2); CCPR, supra note 22, at art. 2(1).
165. Universal Declaration,supra note 18, at art. 7; CCPR, supra note 22, at
art. 26; Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 54, at art. 5(a); and
CEDAW, supra note 54, at art. 15.
166. Universal Declaration,supra note 18, at art. 8. See CCPR, supra note
22, at art. 3(a) (requiring that each contracting state ensure "any person"
whose rights or freedoms recognized by the covenant have an effective
remedy). Those rights and freedoms belong to each individual.
167. Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of
TransnationalCorporations in Protection of International Human Rights, 6
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 162 (1997).
168. Norms, supra note 1, at art. 1.
169. Id. at art. 2.
170. Id. at arts. 3-4.
171. Id. at arts. 5-9.
172. Id. at arts. 10-12.
173. Id. at art. 13.
174. Id. at art. 14.
175. Norms, supra note 1, at arts. 15-19.
176. Id. at arts. 20-23.
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duties." ' The context is unreservedly one of rights-holders and
duty-providers.
There is no doubt or hesitation in these
assertions.
Article 7 of the Norms, for example, requires transnational
corporations to provide a safe and healthy working environment.'
The corresponding Commentary article clarifies this duty, stating
that transnational corporations and other business entities must
"consult and cooperate fully with health, safety and labour
authorities, workers' representatives and their organizations and
establish safety and health organizations on matters of
occupational health and safety. " 179 Within this context, companies
must provide
complaint mechanisms
and corresponding
procedures where the employee will not fear reprisal.'8
"Safe and healthy working conditions" are a "fundamental
right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable
conditions of work" under the CESC.' 8'
Nonetheless, the
Australian mining industry, for instance, "does not have a
grievance mechanism despite its large size and the significant
environmental and social impacts it can have."182 Communities in
Peru, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia
complained about human rights abuses and environmental
degradation perpetrated by the Australian mining industry to
Oxfam Community Aid Abroad. 8 ' There is often no institution
available to complainants seeking redress, "which has allowed
some mining companies simply to disregard their concerns.""
There has been a worldwide shift to contingent or temporary
workers who do not receive benefits. 8' "Only some 20% of the
world's workers have adequate social protection." 88
Eighty
percent of the world's workers, therefore, have their inviolable87
human right to social security and social insurance violated.
"Some 3,000 people a day die from work-related accidents or
diseases,"'88 despite their universal right to safe and healthy
working conditions.
177. Commentary, supra note 14.
178. Norms, supra note 1, at art. 7.
179. Commentary, supra note 14, at art. 7(b).
180. Id.
181. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 7(b).
182. OXFAM CMTY. AID ABROAD, 2001 - 2002 MINING OMBUDSMAN ANNUAL
REPORT 4 (2002), available at http://www.oxfam.org/au/campaigns/mining/
ombudsman/index.htm (last visited June 24, 2004).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Shelton, supra note 41, at 296.
186. Id.
187. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 9. See Universal Declaration,supra note
18, at art. 22.
188. Shelton, supra note 41, at 296.
189. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 7(b).
Also see the following ILO
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Here, the Norms seek merely to secure the recognition,
respect, protection, and fulfillment of the rights set forth in the
Universal Declaration, under which "everyone is entitled to a
social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set
19 °
forth in [the] Declaration can be fully realized."
The context for Article 6 concerns the rights of children and
transnational corporations' duty to protect them from economic
The Commentary specifically defines "economic
exploitation.'
exploitation of children" as employment or work, other than light
work, before a child completes compulsory schooling, reaches the
age of either fifteen or the age when compulsory schooling is no
The Commentary cites specific examples of
longer required.9
what does and does not constitute "economic exploitation of
children," leaving little or no room for doubt. Exploitation includes
employing them in a manner that harms their health or
development; prevents them from going to school; or is
inconsistent with well-established conventions against child
labor.9 "Work done by children in schools for general, vocational,
or technical education or in other training institutions," on the
other hand, does not constitute economic exploitation.
The Country Report of the United States Department of
State, which estimates that 15,000 child slaves worked on cocoa,
cotton and coffee farms in the Ivory Coast in the year 2000, depicts
a well-known context for this Norm.9 Cocoa, most of it exported,
fuels one-third of the Ivory Coast's economy." In this instance,
the chocolate industry actually "announced that it accepted
responsibility for labor practices on cocoa farms and will work with
other stakeholders to eliminate child slavery."'97 Who has room for
doubt in this context?

Conventions: C 115 Radiation Protection Convention, 1960; C 119 Guarding of
Machinery Convention, 1963; C 148 Working Environment (Air Pollution,
Noise and Vibration) Convention, 1977; C 155 Occupational Safety and Health
Convention, 1981; C 161 Occupational Health Services Convention, 1985; C
174 Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents Convention, 1993; as well as the
(non-binding) Recommendations thereto.
190. Universal Declaration,supra note 18, at art. 28.
191. Norms, supra note 1, at art. 6.
192. Commentary, supra note 14, at art. 6(a).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,
AFRICAN COUNTRIES (2000), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt
2000/af/8355.htm (last visited June 23, 2004).
196. Child Labor Coalition, Nothing Sweet: Child Slave Labor in Ivory Coast
Cocoa Fields, at httpJ/www.stopchildlabor.org/internationalchildlabor/
facts.htm (last visited July 8, 2004).
197. Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon.
An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and their Impact on the Liability of
MultinationalCorporations,20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 94 n. 11 (2002).
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Article 11 of the Norms provides, in part, that transnational
corporations
shall not offer, promise, give, accept, condone, knowingly benefit
from, or demand a bribe or other improper advantage, nor shall they
be solicited or expected to give a bribe or other improper advantage
to any Government, public official, candidate for elective post, any
member of the armed forces or security forces, or any other
individual or organization. 98
This language essentially summarizes the anti-bribery
provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act'" and the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention." ° Though these instruments vary and
each contain gray areas, the language of the Norms does not
"muddy up the waters" confusing generally accepted international
norms against corruption and bribery. The context remains
unchanged.
Although specific or limited purpose and powers requirements
no longer exist in the corporation statutes of most American
states, no state "removed the requirement that the corporation's
purposes and activities be 'lawful' or 'legal.'.'. Unocal's articles of
incorporation state that its purpose is "to engage in any lawful act
or activity for which a corporation may be organized under
California law."'0 ' Nike's corporate charter states that its purpose
is "to engage in any lawful activity for which corporations may be
organized under Oregon law" (italics added)." 3 The Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, adopted by Delaware, New York,
Illinois, and many other business-oriented states, provides that
"every corporation incorporated under this Act has the purpose of
engaging in any lawful business.""°'
Corporations are not strangers to law; they are creatures of
law. Their goals are primarily economic growth and profit
maximization. The context of the corporate pursuit of these goals
is not doubted. Human beings, their work and some level of
interaction with the environment are the perennial context of any
business enterprise. The fact that corporate illegality is difficult to
control and that their conduct is "imperfectly regulated by social

198. Norms, supra note 1, at art. 11.
199. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 94 Stat.
1494-98 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78m).
200. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., CONVENTION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, at http://www.oecd.org (last visited June 22, 2004).

201. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate
Illegality (with Notes on how Corporate Law Could Reinforce International
Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1316 (2001).
202. Id. at 1318 (emphasis added).
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Id.
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controls" 5 does not cast the slightest doubt on their legal or moral
obligations. Rather, it demonstrates the factual truth that money
and might often allow corporations to elude consequences of
derogating norms assumed by domestic and international law.
The Norms are not flawed. Instead, the context in which
transnational corporations frame their human rights duties is
what is fundamentally flawed. The UN consulted both the IOE
As they see it,
and the ICC when constructing the Norms.2
"business principles and responsibilities should be developed and
implemented by the companies themselves" in order for them to be
"effective and relevant to a company's specific circumstances." 7
The language clearly reflects their viewpoint that international
human rights are management issues. It is their framework that
is fundamentally flawed.
Development of efficient internal
systems to ensure effective compliance with these legal norms is a
management issue specific to each company's circumstances. How
to comply is a management question; whether to comply is a legal
one.
The IOE and the ICC further object to the Norms because
they are "bound to conflict with company policies and practices
based on history, culture, philosophy and laws and regulations of
the countries in which they operate."2° States cannot derogate or
limit the rights recognized in the CESC based on arguments of
different social, religious, or cultural background.2" Why should a
business be able to do so?
International business groups further allege the Norms are
flawed because they are counterproductive to the UN's ongoing
efforts encouraging companies to support and observe human
rights norms by participating in the Global Compact. 10 The
glaring error in this assertion is that the Global Compact is not
legally enforceable21 while the Norms are.212 Promulgation of the
Norms does not preclude, in any way, companies from
participating in the Compact. Their provisions are based on the
same human rights standards and culled from essentially the
same international instruments. Therefore, a good faith reading
demonstrates that participation in the Compact, and the exchange
of information and best practices with other transnational
corporations at annual international meetings (such as the

205. Id. at 1290.
206. Joint Views, supra note 15.

See also CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY,

supra note 151.
207. Joint Views, supra note 15.
208. Id.

209.
210.
211.
212.

MaastrichtGuidelines,supra note 51, at art. 8.
Joint Views, supra note 15.
Global Compact, supra note 3. See Nine Principles,supra note 4.
Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl. 15.
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meeting held last year in Belo Horizonte, Brazil), would constitute
a useful management approach to identify and implement
initiatives most relevant to the company's circumstances.2 13 The
purpose of the Compact is to unite transnational corporations with
the four "core" UN agencies: the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, the United Nations Environment Programme
[sic], the International Labour Organization and the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization. 14
Simply
reviewing the websites of these agencies offers an unsurpassed
wealth of information."
It is difficult to imagine that these
organizations would not offer tremendous assistance to
transnational corporations in complying with the Norms.
What the transnational corporations lack is good faith. Not
only do transnational corporations oppose both the Norms and
their legally binding status, but some declared they will not stay
in the Compact if the labor rules enshrined in the Declaration of
the Tripartite Principles and the Social Policy of the ILO are
imposed on them.2"6 However, these labor rules are not, nor can
they be, "imposed" on companies as they imply. As with all ILO
Conventions, business was involved in the tri-partite development
and decision making process throughout the drafting and adopting
process.217 The origin of the Tripartite Declaration lies in a
Tripartite Meeting of Experts between Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy held in 1972.1 Through the five years it took to
complete the Tripartite Declaration, transnational corporations
participated in, and were consulted, regarding research, studies,
recommendations and drafts that covered "all of the areas of ILO
concern which relate to the social aspects of the activities of
multinational enterprises."219 Either transnational corporations
can fulfill their legal duty to obey these international legal
instruments, or they can breach. The legal question focuses on the
obligation to adhere, not some far-fetched exemption from this
duty.

213. Global Compact, supra note 3.
214. Nine Principles,supra note 4.
215. See
the
following
web
addresses:
http://www.unhchr.ch;.
http://www.unep.org; http://www.ilo.org; http://www.unido.org.
216. AM. AS'N OF JURISTS AND CENTRE EUROPE TIERS MONDE, THE
ACTIVITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, ACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF

THE C]LIGNY SEMINAR, available at: http://www.cetim.ch/activeng.htm (last
visited June 22, 2004) [hereinafter CELIGNY SEMINAR].
217. Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy, adopted Nov. 1977, 38 I.L.O. A(3), pmbl. 3,
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/html (last visited June 20, 2004)
[hereinafter Tripartite Declaration]. The Governing Body of the International
Labour Office adopted this Declaration at its 204th Session.
218. Id. at pmbl. 5.
219. Id. at pmbl.
4-8.
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By insisting that the Tripartite Declaration not apply to
them, these transnational corporations essentially seek a
reservation to the Compact that is incompatible with its object or
purpose, a violation of international law. 22 °
The Tripartite
Declaration, one of the three foundation documents of the
Compact,"2 provides the framework for the labor standards of the
Compact' and restates fundamental international human rights
law of freedom of association," collective bargaining 24 and
examination of worker grievances "without suffering any prejudice
whatsoever as a result."225 The Tripartite Declaration notes that
transnational corporations have a burden, or duty, to provide a
non-retaliatory grievance procedure. 6 This obligation is all the
more important when they are operating "in countries which do
not abide by the principles of ILO Conventions pertaining to
freedom of association, to the right to organize and bargain
collectively, and to forced labor." 7
Transnational corporations feel very put upon by what they
see as the "bureaucratization" and "restrictions" imposed on them
by the Norms."
This so-called bureaucratization cramps their
creative compliance style, they assert. 9 Their claim is that they
prefer to "exceed legal requirements to voluntarily advance their
own corporate responsibility programs and practices, particularly
where local law is absent or insufficient." ° Yet, they seek
exemption from a century's worth of established international law
concerning the rights of employees and duties of employers. 1 The
Tripartite Declaration specifically references fifteen ILO
Conventions
and
nineteen
Recommendations,
including
Convention (No. 29) concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor,
1930, an ILO fundamental human rights document to which 163
22
as well as more recent international
states are parties,
conventions such as Convention (No. 122) concerning Employment
Policy, 1964, ratified by ninety-four states.'
220. Vienna Convention, supra note 32, at art. 19(c).
221. Nine Principles,supra note 4
222. See id. where the relevant standards are to (3) uphold freedom of
association; (4) eliminate all forms of forced and compulsory labor; (5) abolish
child labor; and (6) eliminate employment and occupation discrimination.
223. Tripartite Declaration, supra note 217, at arts. 41-47.
224. Id. at arts. 48-55.
225. Id. at art. 57.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Corporate Responsibility,supra note 151.
229. Id.
230. Id. (emphasis added).
231. CELIGNY SEMINAR, supra note 216.
232. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, 39 U.N.T.S. 55
(entered into force May 1, 1932).
233. Convention Concerning Employment Policy, 569 U.N.T.S. 65 (entered
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When seeking to make a reservation to the Compact in
contravention of its purpose and object, human rights,
transnational corporations should consider the reasoning of the
International Court of Justice when it determined that the
appropriate criterion for making a reservation would be the
compatibility of the reservation with the purpose of the
Convention.234 Because the object and purpose of the Genocide
Convention is one of fundamental human rights, the Court
reasoned that contracting parties "[did] not have any interests of
their own; they merely had, one and all, a common interest,
namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the
raison d'Atre of the convention."" By seeking exemption from the
Tripartite Declaration, transnational corporations misunderstand
the fundamental distinction between human rights conventions
and contracts for the sale of Nike sneakers. In a human rights
convention, parties recognize rights, rather than negotiate or
bargain for them." 6
As memorialized in the Tripartite
Declaration, and confirmed by the Genocide Convention advisory
opinion, this results in a heightened, not diminished, common duty
to perform.
The international community has actually been declaring
human rights law, particularly workplace human rights law, since
before World War II2
Many transnational corporations have
simply been violating the legal rights of their employees and other
affected persons for decades."s Nonetheless, the world community
has never accepted or acquiesced to the lawlessness of these
entities' conduct. Indeed, one of the stated reasons for issuing the
Norms is that:
the Governing Body Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy, the Committee of Experts on the Application of
Standards, as well as the Committee on Freedom of Association of
the International Labour Organization, which have named business
enterprises implicated in States' failure to comply with Conventions
No. 87 concerning the Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize and No. 98 concerning the Application3 9of the
Principles of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.
"New international human rights issues and concerns are
continually
arising"
and
often
involve
transnational

into force July 9, 1965).
234. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, (Advisory Opinion), 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. For example, see the International Labour Organization website at

http://www.ilo.org (last visited June 21, 2004)..
238. Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl.
8, 12.
239. Id. at pmbl. 8.
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corporations." ' For this reason, at the start of this century, the
United Nations decided to set forth and implement standards24 1
similar to how the International Labour Organization did at the
beginning of last century. 242 The rules are not new, nor are the
violations.
One hundred forty-two countries have ratified Convention No.
87, concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right
to Organize, 1948."
One hundred fifty-three countries have
ratified Convention No. 98, concerning the Application of the
Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively,
1949.2" Of the 180 Conventions and 185 Recommendations put in
place by the ILO, Conventions, Nos. 87 and 98 are amongst the
eight core conventions the ILO itself
considers "fundamental to the
2 45
rights of human beings at work."
The ILO is "a tripartite organization, the only one of its kind
bringing together representatives of governments, employers and
workers in its executive bodies."2
It enjoys international legal
personality.247 The ILO's governing board, the Executive Council,
has fifty-six members today.2" Half of the Council represents
governments.1' Fourteen members represent trade unions and
other workers' groups; the remaining fourteen represent
employers, largely from transnational corporations. °
The ILO was created in 1919, at the time of the Paris Peace
Conference, and its Constitution became Part XIII of the Treaty of
Versailles."' The ILO's Constitution links civil and political rights
to economic, social, and cultural rights, and provides that all these
rights are necessary for world peace."2 The ILO is the only
240. Id. at pmbl. 12.
241. Id.
242. Int'l Labour Org., What are International Labour Standards?, at

http'/www.ilo.org/publi/english/standards/norm/whatare/index.htm

(last

updated Oct. 20, 2000) [hereinafter ILO Standards].
243. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
Convention No. 87, concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force July 4,
1950) [hereinafter ILO Association].
244. Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention No. 98,
concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to
Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 (entered into force July 18,
1951 ) [hereinafter ILO Organization]..
245. ILO Standards,supra note 242.
246. Int'l Labour Org., ILO History, at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
about/history.htm (last updated Oct. 26, 2000) [Hereinafter ILO History].

247. I.L.O. CONST. art. 39.
248. ILO History, supra note 246.

249.
250.
251.
252.
based

Id.
Id.
Id.
"Whereas universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is
upon social justice, and whereas conditions of labour exist involving
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surviving organization from the League of Nations, and it was the
first organization brought into the newly constituted United
Nations. 253 The United States became a member of the ILO in
1934 even though it did not belong to the League of Nations.
The ILO adopted its first six standards in 1919, and its
supervisory system on the application of its standards in 1926. 25
The ILO standard-setting system still exists today.256 "The
ILO's standards take the form of international labour Conventions
and Recommendations."25 7 Whereas ILO Recommendations are
non-binding, the ILO Conventions are "international treaties,
subject to ratification by ILO member States."2 1 One hundred
seventy-seven nation states belong to the ILO. 259' Even nations
that
do not ratify a given Convention are bound not to act against
260
it.
Although the original purpose for creating the ILO was to
adopt international standards dealing with labor problems and
conditions involving "injustice, hardship, and privation," the ILO
mandate expanded in 1944, with the incorporation of the
Declaration of Philadelphia 261 into its Constitution and with the
broadening of its standard-setting mandate to include "social
policy, human and civil rights matters."262 Before the end of the
Second World War, the international legal community already
averred that economic and political rights were the foundation of
world peace and that their achievement depended upon the
"continuous and concerted international efforts"26 of all parties
responsible for it: workers, employers and governments.
such injustice, hardship and privation to large members of people as to
produce unrest so great that peace and harmony of the world are
imperiled...." I.L.O. CONST. pmbl.

253.
254.
255.
256.

ILO History, supra note 246.
Id.
Id.
Id.

257. ILO Standards,supra note 242.

258. Id.
259. Int'l Labour Org., Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, at

http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm

(last updated

Oct. 7, 2003).
260. ILO History,supra note 246.

261. The four fundamental principles on which the ILO is based and which
were reaffirmed in the "Declaration of Philadelphia" are: 1) Labor is not a
commodity; 2) Freedom of expression and association are essential to progress;
3) Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere; and 4)

The war against want requires to be carried on with unrelenting vigor within
each nation and by continuous and concerted international effort in which
representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of
governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic decision with a

view to promotion of the common welfare. I.L.O. CONST.
262. ILO Standards, supra note 242.

263. Id.
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Transnational corporations repeatedly disregard and violate
international human rights law of global employees." Therefore,
it is not surprising that the Norms specifically mention that the
"conventions and recommendations of the International Labour
Organization" are amongst the United Nations treaties and other
international instruments which "transnational corporations and
other business enterprises, their officers and persons working for
them are ... obligated to respect."2" " The "standards set forth in
the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy and the Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work2 of the International Labour
Organization" are separately stated as instruments taken into
account when interpreting the Norms.267
In addition to the ILO instruments (the UN Charter and the
Universal Declaration), the Preamble to the Norms recalls,
recognizes and incorporates every human rights international
covenant, declaration and protocol thereto issued by the United
Nations itself.2 ' Additionally, it recognizes and incorporates
regional human rights instruments and conventions related to
human rights, workplace rights, development and environmental
rights. 269 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
which established the International Criminal Court at the Hague;
the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the
Ethical Criteria for Medical Drug Promotion and the "Health for
All in the Twenty-First Century" policy of the World Health
Organization are just examples of this.27°
The Slavery

264. Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl. 8.

265. Id. at pmbl. 4.
266. The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
adopted in 1998, restates the four fundamental ILO principles regarding i)
freedom of association and collection bargaining, (ii) forced or compulsory
labor, (iii) child labor and (iv) workplace discrimination.

INT'L LABOR ORG.,

DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK (1998).

The Declaration requests that all parties reaffirm these principles and
promote their application in light of the "urgent" situation of growing economic
interdependence. Id. It also refers to the need to give special attention to the
unemployed and migrant workers. Id. See Shelton, supra note 41, at 296
(discussing how migrant workers are most severely impacted by the shift to a
benefit-free workplace). In particular, "women comprise the largest segment
of migrant labor flows, both internally and internationally. States often do not
include migrant workers in their labor standards, leaving women particularly
vulnerable." Id.
267. Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl. 5.
268. Id. at pmbl. 1-5.
269. Id.
270. Id. at pmbl. 4.
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Convention, 7' an instrument of the League of Nations given full
legal force and effect by a United Nations protocol, " is listed
among all the other anti-slavery conventions of the UN.7 The full
body of international human rights law, both those recently
recognized and those set in stone, has been set forth,27 4 lest
ignorance of the law rear its disdainful little head. If there is an
omission from this exhaustive list, transnational corporations and
their agents must still obey "other instruments."7'
VI. COMMENTARY: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

The Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights276 ("Commentary") is clear and detailed
as to construction and interpretation of the Norms. The rules of
construction and interpretation are set forth in Section A., General
Obligations.27 ' States retain general obligations of promotion,
fulfillment of, respecting and ensuring the respect and protection
of human rights, including ensuring that transnational
corporations also respect them.7
Transnational corporations,
"within their respective spheres of activity and influence," have
the same duties, including the duty to respect "the rights and
interest of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups."2 9
This language, "respect, protect, and fulfill," establishes
duties, the breach of which constitute violations of the CESC, as
28 °
explained in the Maastricht Guidelines.
The Maastricht
Guidelines make it clear that States owe these duties to their
citizens under international law, and that failure to comply with
these rights constitutes a violation of them.28 1 "The obligation to
respect, for example, requires States to refrain from interfering
with the enjoyment of their people's economic, social, and cultural
rights. Thus, the right to housing is violated if the State engages
271. Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253. The recitals of this
convention reference the General Act of Brussels Conference, 1889-90,
expressing their firm intention to "putting an end to traffic in African slaves"
as well as the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919, whose intention
was to "secure the complete suppression of slavery in all its forms". Id.
(emphasis added).
272. Transfer to the United Nations of the Functions exercised by the
League of Nations under the Slavery Convention of 25 Sept. 1926, G.A. Res.
794 (VIII), U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., 453d plen. mtg. (1953).
273. Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl T4.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Commentary, supra note 14.
277. Id. at art. 1 cmt. (a).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 51, at art. 6.
281. Id.
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in arbitrary forced evictions .",2

The Norms now unequivocally provide that transnational
corporations also have obligations "recognized in national as well
as international law. "2' While the Norms reflect the development
of international law, human rights norms do not bind merely
states and their agents. Instead, as the Second Circuit held in
Kadic v. Radovan Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (1995), "certain
forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by
those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
individuals." The adoption of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," entered into force
on September 3, 1953, and ratified by all but one of the signatory
countries of the Council of Europe,2" ("Rome Convention") also
attests to this development. Article 19 of the Rome Convention
establishes the European Court of Human Rights, which functions
on a permanent basis.' Unlike the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") established by Article 92 of the United Nations Charter
and succeeded to the Permanent Court of International Justice"87individuals, groups of individuals and non-governmental
organizations can bring a suit claiming violation of their human
rights before the permanent Court of Human Rights.2" This
broadens development of international law; while the ICJ's
subject-matter jurisdiction includes human rights violations, only
United Nations member states have standing to bring disputes
before it.9 In important dictum in a 1999 human rights suit, the
United States District Court of New Jersey stated that "no logical
reason exists for allowing private individuals and corporations to
escape liability for universally condemned violations of
international law merely because they were not acting under the
color of law."'
"The obligation of transnational corporations and other
business enterprises under these Norms applies equally to
activities occurring in the home country or territory of the

282. Id. (emphasis added).
283. Norms, supra note 1, at art. 1.
284. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (as amended by Protocol No. 3
(entered into force Sept. 21, 1970), Protocol No. 5 (entered into force Dec. 20,
1971), Protocol No. 8 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1990) and Protocol No. 11
(entered into force Nov. 1, 1998)) [hereinafter the Rome Convention].
285. Council of Europe, The Conventions, at httpJ/conventions.coe.int (last
visited July 1, 2004).
286. Rome Convention, supra note 284, at art. 19.
287. ICJ Statute, art. 37, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060..
288. Rome Convention, supra note 284, at art. 34.
289. ICJ Statute, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 and art. 41(1) at 1061..
290. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Company, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D. N.J.
1999).
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transnational corporation or other business enterprise, and in any
country in which the business is engaged in activities.""' Whether
employees at NCR's headquarters in the suburbs of Chicago, or
indigenous people of Myanmar -- where Unocal and TotalFina
built a gas pipeline, and where "there is little question that
thousands of villagers were impressed to perform labor for the
benefit of [the] pipeline project"9 2 -- all people hold these rights as
members of society. 3
It is undisputed that transnational
corporations must observe these rights under a universal
obligation.
Also as part of the general interpretative construct,
transnational corporations "shall have the duty to use due
diligence in ensuring that their activities do not contribute directly
or indirectly to human abuses," 9 ' and "that they do not directly or
indirectly benefit from abuses of which they were aware or ought
to have been aware.""' In other words, Nike cannot be excused
from breaching human rights obligations to the workers at the
Doson factory in Indonesia from which it purchased its shoes by
merely claiming it had no knowledge that workers were not paid
enough, despite full-time employment and overtime, to meet their
families' basic needs." This violates the workers' rights under the
CESC, which provides that everyone has the right to fair wages27
and an "adequate standard of living for himself and his family." 29
Nor can Nike disclaim liability for human rights abuses through
assertions of ignorance of its extensive use of child labor,
particularly children under the age of 10, in violation of the
following international human rights laws: Article 10(3) of the
CESC;2 ' Article 32 of the CRC; ° and the two ILO core human
291. Commentary, supra note 14, at art. 1 cmt. (a).
292. Terry Collingsworth, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: The Key
Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARV.
HUM. RTs. J. 183, 188 (2002).
293. UniversalDeclaration,supra note 18, at art. 22.
294. Commentary, supra note 14, at art. 1 cmt. (a).

295. Id. at art. 1 cmt. (b).
296. TIMOTHY CONNOR, WE ARE NOT MACHINES 6 (2002), available at

http://www.oxfam.org.au/campaigns/nike/reports/machines/notmachines.pdf
(last visited June 14, 2004).
297. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 7

1(a).

298. Id. at art. 11 1.
299. "Children and young persons should be protected from economic and
social exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to their morals or
health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development
should be punishableby law." Id. (emphasis added).
300. CRC, supra note 54.
(1) Children have the right to be protected from economic exploitation
and from performing any work likely to be hazardous or to interfere

with their education, or to be harmful to their health or their physical,
mental, spiritual, moral or social development. (2) States are expected
to provide (a) minimum age for employment; (b) regulation of work
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rights conventions, the Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)
and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999.01
A simple visit to the website of the United States Department
of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices would tell
Nike that although the Indonesian government passed legislation
to protect children, implementation of the law was weak and child
The Department of State
labor remained a major problem."'
website reports that Indonesian manufacturers hire women in lowpaying, low-level jobs, and that "female workers tend to be hired
as day laborers, instead of as full-time permanent employees, and
companies are not required to provide benefits, such as maternity
leave, to day laborers." 30 3 This is a clear violation of two core ILO
human rights conventions: the Equal Remuneration Convention,
1951 (No. 100) and the Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) as well as three ILO basic
Indonesian
human rights and employment conventions.3°
manufacturers also violate female employees' human rights under
Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
DiscriminationAgainst Women ("CEDAW"), to which Indonesia is
a contracting party. 30 5
Under the UN Norms, there is no need to establish joint
action of the transnational corporation and the government
violating its human rights duties toward its own citizens or
subjects. The Norms do not assert that Nike is in a position, legal
or otherwise, to bring suit against Indonesia for violating the
CEDAW.
Nor do they assert that Nike can or must force
Indonesia to implement its own child labor laws. Under the due
diligence obligation Nike owes to the Doson factory employees,

hours and conditions; and (c) provide penalties and sanctions for these

violations.
Just because the state hasn't fulfilled its end, or cannot or will not
enforce the laws it has promulgated does not mean that companies do
not violate the rights of children when employing them at too young an
age, for too many hours, in dangerous conditions in their mines, on their

plantations, in their factories.
Id.
301. See ILO Standards, supra note 243 (stating that "132 countries have
ratified this convention in under three years, making it the fastest to be
ratified in the ILO's 82-year history, and clearly demonstrating rapidly
growing worldwide support against abusive child labor").
302. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2002 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

PRACTICES, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18245.htm
(last visited July 6, 2004).
303. Id.
304. The Maternity Protection Convention, 1919 (No.3); the Maternity
Protection Convention (Revised), 1952 (No. 103); and the Workers with Family
Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156).
305. CEDAW, supra note 54.
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from whose work it certainly benefits, Nike simply cannot turn a
blind eye, willfully or negligently, to the fact that workers,
particularly women and small children, are forced to work 14 to 16
hour days to fill orders for sneakers, and that wages earned do not
meet the minimum standard of living in their own country.3" Nike
does not have strict liability under the Norms. Instead, they
cannot benefit from or contribute to abuses of which they were
either aware or ought to have been aware."' The Commentary
specifically explains that transnational corporations "shall
assure... monitoring (of human rights compliance) by their
contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees, distributors, and
any other natural or legal persons with whom they have entered
into any agreements, to the extent possible.""8 Should a cause of
action arise, the rest is a question of proof.
Whereas Nike breached its duty to respect workers' human
rights, Coca-Cola flagrantly violated its due diligence duty to
protect the human rights of workers from whom it certainly
Coca-Cola was fully aware that the manager of the
benefited."
Coca-Cola bottling plant, Ariosto Mosquera, planned and carried
out execution of trade union leaders.31 The union had asked them
for protection the first time after the manager brought
paramilitaries into the factory and stood beside them as he
The union contacted
threatened to "sweep away the union."'
Coca-Cola for help, but received no response."2 Nor did Coke
respond to their entreaties after the union office was burnt down
and "the paramilitaries were welcomed back into the plant by the
management, and were permitted to address the workers, who
Coke had
were warned to resign from the union or die."" '
knowledge that the paramilitaries led the workers into the
manager's office, where the manager had union resignation forms
ready for all of the workers to sign."4
When sued by the Estate of Isidro Gil, a union leader killed
by paramilitaries following the threats of which Coca-Cola had full
knowledge, Coca-Cola defended by alleging it had no control over
the bottling plant with which it had an "anchor bottler"
agreement" (an agreement "exclusively on behalf of and for the
306. CONNOR, supra note 296, at 9.
307. Commentary, supra note 14, at art. 1 cmt. (b).
308. Id. at art. 16 cmt. (d) (emphasis added).
309. Plaintiffs Memo in Response to Motion to Dismiss at 4, United Steel
Workers v. Panamerican Bottling Co., (S.D. Fla. 2001), available at
http://www.cokewatch.org/resdismFINAL.rtf [hereinafter USW Memo] (last
visited July 8, 2004).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 19.
314. Id. at 18.
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benefit of Coca-Cola," one of seventeen such agreements in place
throughout Colombia)." 5 Coca-Cola certainly has not met the due
diligence standard under Article 1(b) of the Commentary based on
its flagrant violations of Article 8 of the CESC..6 and Article 22 of
the CCPR,317 as well as ILO Conventions No. 87"' and 98,'
Universal Declaration Articles 2030 and 23(4),' 21 and several other
instruments of international human rights law. Under the duty to
monitor the human rights complaints of licensees,3 Coke would
not be able to assert, as it has, that it knew of the abuses, 1 but
disclaimed responsibility for the abuses because it does not own
the Colombian bottling plants.2 4
In establishing this duty to monitor, the Norms simply
implement the 1999 General Assembly Declaration on the Right
and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society
("RR of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society"). 5 whereby "no
one shall participate, by act or failure to act where required, in
violating human rights and fundamental freedoms." 26 The extent
of Coca-Cola's participation, or action, in the Colombian work
environment plainly demands a level of accountability.
Another rule of construction in the Norms is that
transnational corporations "shall further refrain from activities
that would undermine the rule of law as well as governmental and
other efforts to promote and ensure respect for human rights, and
shall use their influence in order to help promote and ensure
respect for human rights."327 British Petroleum ("BP") is the lead
company in the BTC Consortium ("BTC") pipeline project approved
for funding on November 11, 2003.
The 1,760 kilometer pipeline
will transfer one million barrels of crude oil per day from Baku,
315. Id. at 3
316. Freedom to join trade unions. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 8 9 l(a).
317. Freedom of association, including the right to unionize. CCPR, supra
note 22, at art. 22 911.
318. "Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize." ILO
Association, supra note 243.
319. "Right to organize and collective bargaining." ILO Organization, supra
note 244.
320. "Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association." Universal
Declaration,supra note 18, at art. 20 911.
321. "Right to form and join trade unions." Id. at art 23 V(4).
322. Commentary, supra note 14, at art. 16 cmt. (d).
323. USW Memo, supranote 309, at 3.
324. Id.
325. Declarationon the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human
Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, G.A. Res.53/144, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess.,
85th plen. mtg., at annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144 (1999).
326. Id. at art. 10.
327. Commentary, supra note 14, at art. 1 cmt. (b).
328. Joanna Chung, Fundingfor Oil Pipeline Project Approved, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2003, at Al.
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via Azerbaijan and Georgia, to the Turkish port of Ceyhan"9
Under the host agreements BP negotiated with the Azerbaijani,
Georgian and Turkish governments, BTC is exempt from any
obligations under host country laws, violating both fundamental
norms of national sovereignty and "the citizens' right to redress for
harm that may be done during the course of the project."33 ° In
addition to undermining the rule of law, BP is breaching its duty
to respect the affected people's right of self-determination, by
virtue of which they "freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."33 '
It is further breaching its duty to protect their fundamental right
to an effective remedy," 2 as well as its obligation to fulfill their
right to enjoy their economic, cultural, or social rights, free of
unlawful limitations incompatible with the nature of these rights
within the general welfare of a democratic society."33
The BTC pipeline construction "increases the likelihood of
debilitating landslides and other environmental damage," in
Georgia.3 4 Local Georgian villages, however, are not even marked
on BP's regional maps.335 Landslides, moreover, will only hasten
pipeline corrosion and leaks.336 These actions violate the most
fundamental environmental rights of these Georgian individuals.
The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
("Stockholm Declaration") provides that both natural and manmade aspects of man's environment "are essential to his well-being
and to the enjoyment of basic human rights the right to life
337
Under Principle 18 of the Stockholm Declaration, the
itself."
intended application of science and technology is the identification,
avoidance and control of environmental risks and the solution of
environmental problems.338 The Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, (the "Rio Declaration"), which reaffirms the
Stockholm Declaration and seeks to build upon it,339 provides
under its first principle that "human beings are at the centre of
329. Nick Hildyard et al., Azerbaijan, Georgia & Turkey - BTC Pipeline, in
RACE To THE BOTTOM TAKE II 10 (Gabrielle Watson ed., 2003), available at
(last
http:l/ globalpolicy.igc.org/socecon/tnc/2003/0915racetothebottom.pdf
visited June 22, 2004).
330. Id.
331. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 1 1 1; CCPR, supra note 22, art. 1 $ 1.
332. CCPR, supra note 22, at art. 2 3(b); Universal Declaration,supra note
18, at art. 8.
333. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 4.
334. Hildyard, et al., supra note 329, at 11.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT,
STOCKHOLM DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc

A/CONF.48/14, U.N. Pub. E73,IIA 14 (1973), at pmbl.
338. Id. at Principle 18.
339. RIO DECLARATION, supra note 140, at pmbl.

1.
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concerns for sustainable development," and that "they are entitled
to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature." '
Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration provides that "peace,
development and environmental protection," like economic, social,
cultural, civil and political rights, "are interdependent and
indivisible."4 1 There is no doubt that BP and other consortium
members violated the human rights and fundamental freedoms of
the Georgian people. That human rights enforcement should be
left to nation states is an assertion nothing short of contemptuous
in a context such as this.
In Azerbaijan, again according to the United States
Department of State, ninety percent of the country's export
revenues come from the oil and gas sector.'
Corruption and
patronage are rampant, while the government's human rights
record is poor.'
Georgia's government record is also poor, and
corruption in law enforcement is pervasive.3
The Georgian
judiciary is also "subject to pervasive corruption and does not
ensure due process.""5 Trafficking in forced labor remains a
problem." Nonetheless, representatives of international business
aver the Norms are flawed because
"human rights violations are a
7
task for national governments."
Instead of using its influence to help promote and ensure
respect for human rights, BP actually boasts about its own
ingenuity with regards to human rights violations committed
against the Georgian and Azerbaijan people.' The construction of
the
pipeline
directly
below
people's
houses
without
compensation," 9 violates the fundamental rights to selfdetermination, 50 to health,"' to enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications35 and not to be arbitrarily deprived of
property.'

340. Id. at Principle 1.
341. Id. at Principle 25.
342. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2002 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES:
AZERBIJAN
(2003),
available
at:
httpJ/www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18353.htm (last visited July 2. 2004).
343. Id.
344. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2002 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES:
GEORGIA,
(2003),
available
at:http://www.state/gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18366.htm (last visited July 2,
2004).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Joint Views, supra note 15.
348. Hildyard, et al., supra note 329, at 12.
349. Id.
350. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 1; CCPR, supra note 22, at art. 1.
351. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 12.
352. Id. at art. 15 1(1(b)).
353. Universal Declaration,supra note 18, at art. 17 (2).
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BTC did not single out Azerbaijan and Georgia for human
rights violations. The host agreements give Turkish security
forces controlling the project permission to take action for "civil
disturbance."54
The extraordinary vagueness of a rubric like civil disturbance would
be worrying enough in a country with a decent human rights record;
in Turkey, where responsibility for security has been handed to the
gendarmerie, a paramilitary force implicated in the very worst
atrocities of the civil war against the country's Kurds, it is hugely
disturbing. 5
BP has hired Turkish security forces to guard both
construction and maintenance of the BTC pipeline.35 This despite
the easily ascertainable fact that Turkish security forces
committed serious human rights abuses, particularly in the
Turkish countryside even though civilian and military authorities
publicly commit to respect human rights and the rule of law." ' Is
this the national government to whom the Turkish and ethnic
Kurdish people's human rights should be "left"?
Finally, transnational corporations have a legal duty to
"inform themselves of the human rights impact of their principal
activities and major proposed activities so that they can further
avoid complicity in human rights abuses."358 Under a contract with
the United States government, DynCorp Corporation sprays toxic
herbicide on Ecuadorian communities as part of the United States
Government's "Plan Colombia," an operation attempting to
eradicate coca plants in Colombia.359 The International Labor
Rights Fund filed suit against DynCorp "on behalf of at least
10,000 Ecuadorian plaintiffs [who] are suffering serious health
effects as a result of the spraying."36 ° DynCorp certainly violated
its duty to inform itself of the impact of its own activities. If true,
its actions clearly violate the Ecuadorian plaintiffs' right to
health."' By failing to inform itself of the human rights impact of
its activities, DynCorp will most likely not avoid complicity in the
human rights abuses that the United States Government is
perpetrating on the plaintiffs.
"The Unocal case is significant because it was the first
lawsuit in which a court acknowledged that a [multinational

354. Hildyard, et al., supra note 329, at 12.
355. Id.

356. Id.
357. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2002 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

http://www.state.gov/
(2003),
available
at
PRACTICES:
TURKEY
g/dr]/rls/hrrpt2002/18396.htm (last visited July 2, 2004).
358. Commentary, supra note 14, at art. 1.
359. Collingsworth, supra note 292, at 195.

360. Id.
361. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 12.
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corporation] could be liable for a violation of international law."
Under their legal obligations to respect, protect and fulfill required
by the Norms, neither Nike nor Coca-Cola could put forth the
kinds of arguments Unocal did in its defense in a suit brought
under the Alien Torts Claim Act.3" Unocal argued that, as a
passive investor in the Myanmar pipeline, it was removed from
the decisions related to forced labor made by the Myanmar
government. " Therefore, Unocal had no liability for violating the
villagers' universal human right against forced labor.365 The 9th
Circuit, nonetheless, found sufficient evidence for a jury to find
3
that Unocal had aided and abetted the Myanmar government. 6
Under an expanding definition of "aiding and abetting," accomplice
mens rea need not be that of perpetrator mens rea"
"Knowing
practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect
on the perpetration of the crime" is sufficient to determine the
requisite mental state of the private party defendant, the 9th
Circuit held.3"
This is further evidence of an evolving
understanding of private party liability in international law.
However, the human rights duties imposed by the Norms
require neither assertion nor proof of this mens rea. Instead, the
corporation itself is accountable for its unitary actions that breach
the duties it owes the human beings whose lives it affects.
"Accountability establishes the right of the target state or group to
hold the intervenors responsible for the consequences of their
action."369 Because under the Norms, international law governs
the company's own actions, color of law need not be established. It
is clear that the Myanmar military government was violating its
duties toward its people under the CCPR" ° In addition to nearly
a century's worth of treaties and conventions setting forth
international human rights law, "case law and statements of the

362. Ramasastry, supra note 197, at 132.
363. Collingsworth, supra note 292, at 188-89.
364. Id. at 189.
365. Id.
366. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-5663, 00-57197, 00-56628, 0057195, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, *35 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated by Doe v.
Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-5663, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2716, *3 (9th Cir. 2003).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 97, at 25.
370. "In its Country Reports on Human Rights Practicesfor 1991, the U.S.
Department of State reported that the Myanmar military government
'routinely employs corvee labor on its myriad building projects' and the 'the
Burmese army has for decades conscripted civilian males to serve as porters.'"
John Doe I, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *15 n. 6. Such action has been a
violation of international human rights law since the Convention concerning
Forced or Compulsory Labor. ILO No. 29, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55
(entered into force May 1, 1932).
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Nuremberg Tribunals unequivocally establish that forced labor
violates customary international law."3 ' Unocal's knowledge of
the Myanmar government's actions as of January 4, 1995 is
undisputed.'
It is equally clear, as established by the UN Norms,
that Unocal's unitary abtions 3 3 breached its international legal
obligations to respect, protect and fulfill the rights of the Myanmar
pipeline workers under Article 6 of the CESC 74 as well as other
international
human rights instruments and customary
international law.3 '
As established by Nuremberg over fifty years ago: "economic
interests are not a defense to human rights violations."7 6 Unocal's
actions very much affected the lives of the Burmese villagers.
Almost ninety years ago, Judge Cardozo held that the law imposed
a duty on a defendant-manufacturer because of its affirmative
conduct, which it had to know would likely affect the interests of
another.
International law has finally evolved to the point of
imposing liability on all actors, not just state actors, whose
affirmative conduct affects the interdependent and intertwined
human rights of people such as these Burmese villagers.
VII. ENFORCEMENT
What

was

missing,

until

now,

was

an

enforcement

371. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 441.
372. See John Doe I, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *14 (finding the
existence of substantial evidence that Unocal had knowledge of the human
rights violations occurring as early as May 1992, when its consultants, Control
Risk Group informed that the Myanmar government habitually used forced
labor).
On January 4, 1995, Unocal's president met with human rights organizations
at Unocal's headquarters in Los Angeles and told them that "people are
threatening physical damage to the pipeline," that "if you threaten the
pipeline there's gonna [sic] be more military," and that "if forced labor goes
hand and glove with the military yes there will be more forced labor." Id. at
*16.

373. So, of course, were TotalFina's, Unocal's joint venture partner and
original co-defendant in the case. TotalFina S.A., is a French corporation over
whom the United States District Court was unable to assert personal
jurisdiction. John Doe I,, 963 F. Supp. at 894-95.
374. Providing that the right to work includes the right of everyone to have
the opportunity to make his/her living by work he/she freely chooses or
accepts. CESC, supra note 21, at art. 6.
375. CCPR, supra note 22 at art. 8 The CCPR prohibits slavery, servitude
and forced or compulsory labor; the Universal Declaration recognizes the right
of everyone to free choice of employment. Id.; Universal Declaration,supra
note 18, at art. 23. Unocal and TotalFina also allegedly violated the Burmese
villagers human rights protected by the ILO core conventions, ILO Forced
Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labour
Convention, 1957 (No. 105). John Doe 1, 963 F. Supp. at 885.
376. Collingsworth, supra note 292, at 191.
377. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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mechanism. The United Nations finally answered, or at least
arguably addressed, the nagging question posed by so many
parties involved or interested in international legal problems: "Of
what good is the jungle of documents created by these fancy
international organizations if' they cannot deliv er an iota of
satisfaction
to the poor masses of our so-called civilized
3 7
universe?" 1
Transnational corporations and other business entities will be
subject to "periodic monitoring and verification by United Nations
and other international and national mechanisms already in
existence or yet to be created regarding the application of the
Norms."379 The existing United Nations monitoring bodies set
forth in the Commentary include the human rights treaty bodies,
the specialized agencies, country rapporteurs, and the SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and its relevant working group.' The human rights treaty bodies
were, of course, all established as committees under the
international human rights covenants. 381 The committees, in turn,
report to the ESCOC, who, in turn, reports to the General
Assembly. None of these committees lacks experts, expertise or
structural or institutional validity. What they lack is obvious: a
sanction mechanism.
The specialized agencies may have some bite in encouraging
recalcitrant transnational corporations to implement procedures if
they carry out the suggestions in the Commentary and use the
Norms "as a basis for procurement determinations concerning
products and services to be purchased." 2
The Commentary advises the country rapporteurs to use the
Norms and other relevant international standards to raise
concerns about actions by transnational corporations and other
business entities.8 Raising concerns, for all its hype as the great
regulator of corporate conduct, is no more effective than the
voluntary compliance theory, and never actually hits corporations

378. Sudhir K. Chopra, Multinational Corporations in the Aftermath of
Bhopal: The Need for a New Comprehensive Global Regime for Transnational
CorporateActivity, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 235, 240 (1994).
379. Commentary, supra note 14, at art. 16.
380. Id.
381. Human Rights Committee established by Article 28 of the CCPR;
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination established by Article
8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women established by Article 17 of the CEDAW; Committee Against Torture
established by Article 17 of the Torture Convention; Committee on the Right
of the Child established by Article 43 of the CCR.
382. Commentary, supra note 14, at art. 16(b).
383. Id.
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where it hurts: the bottom line." Although many people "assume
that firms such as Nike, Nestle and Shell have paid heftily for
being targeted by a high-profile [human rights] campaign... the
evidence of damage is scarce."385 "Despite all of the international
reporting and pronouncements, Burma, a charter member of the
World Trade Organization, is still open for business."" 6 So are
Unocal and TotalFina. Though the public revelation of the harsh
working conditions endured by employees like fifteen year-old
Wendy Diaz in Honduras certainly embarrassed Kathie Lee
Gifford, there is no indication that Wal-Mart, who sold the
clothing, saw any related decline in revenues." '
Professor Franqois Rigaux presented a better enforcement
suggestion at the C6ligny Seminar on the Activities of
Transnational
Corporations
organized
by the American
Association of Jurists ("AAJ") and the Europe - Third World
Center ("CETIM") held on May 4 and 5, 2001:
An international court for TNCs should be created through a treaty
between States, such as the International Criminal Court... in
Rome and must be competent to judge TNCs both civilly and
criminally without excluding the responsibility of individuals.
International law in effect regarding human rights should be
applied, establishing a hierarchy of rights where priority is granted
to the most essential of these rights, such as the right to life, to
health, the right not to suffer torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment.3
The Norms now set forth the duties owed by transnational
corporations to the human beings whose lives, health and
environment they affect. Where "beyond all reasonable doubt" is
the standard of proof for criminal conduct, transnational
corporations and their officers and agents have neither a rational
nor a justifiable basis to claim they will be railroaded. If their
outcry over the Norms 9 is any indication, if such a court were
seriously considered, it is practically guaranteed that these
corporations would raise an unprecedented clamor.
Given the Bush Administration's "unprecedented act in
international law" of withdrawing the United States' signature
from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,3 90 it is
most unlikely that the United States would sign a treaty
384. Living with the Enemy, THE ECONOMIST, Aug.9, 2003, at Bus. (U.S.

Edition).
385. Id.
386. Collingsworth, supra note 292, at 184.
387. For background information, see the Clean Clothes website at
http://www.cleanclothes.org (last visited June 24, 2004).
388. CELIGNY SEMINAR, supra note 216.
389. See Joint Views, supra note 15; CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note

151; Birchall, supra note 2.
390. Wojcik, et al., supra note 54, at 597.
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establishing an international court to try transnational
corporations for human rights violations. Given the influence of
corporations in the United States, it is unlikely that the United
States would become a party to such a treaty even in a Democratic
administration. It is doubtful that any of the G-7 countries would
participate for the very same reason.
Another universal remedy to address human rights violations
in the global economy is the one put forth by the International
Labor Rights Fund ("ILRF"). 39' The ILRF is promoting "the
creation of a procedure to enforce human rights on equal footing
with property rights in the World Trade Organization and other
regional trade agreements."39 They developed "a model provision
for human rights to be added to existing and future trade
agreements and [are] working with human rights organizations
around the world to develop support for this approach."393
Nonetheless, "efforts to strengthen human rights protections in
trade law have run into difficulties.
The WTO Singapore
Ministerial Declaration made reference to international labor
standards, yet primarily affirmed the jurisdiction of the ILO over
the matter."394
At present, American and other first-world companies "can
participate in or aid human rights abuses in other countries
confident that the host governments will not enforce local laws.
Often the host governments themselves are participants in the
abuses. This frames the reality of the global economy.""'
Threats of enforcing human rights laws by host countries
need not offend transnational corporations. Nor do they face
significant hazards to the other host-country action potentially
threatening their overseas operations and profits: corporate
property rights. Their own national governments have shielded
them from this peril and have clearly acknowledged that the
rights of these behemoths are inviolable through the terms
negotiated on their behalf under the bilateral investment treaty
regime currently in place.'
As advertised, the transnational
corporate lobby has definitely been "given business a seat at the
table" in the standard dispute resolution clause available to
corporations
in bilateral investment
treaties ("BITs"). 7
Expropriation, (direct or indirect), currency exchange controls and
war and other civil disturbances pose the greatest danger to

391. Collingsworth, supra note 292, at 203.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Shelton, supra note 41, at 289.
395. Collingsworth, supra note 292, at 196.
396. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The PoliticalEconomy of a BilateralInvestment
Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 621, 632-33 (1998).

397. Id. at 633.
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transnational corporations.39 BITs establish legal mechanisms to
Under the dispute resolution
enforce those protections.3"
provisions negotiated by the United States in its BIT treaties, a
private party investor ultimately has' the legal power to invoke
compulsory arbitration against the host country before the
International Centre for the Settlement of Dispute Resolutions
and to secure a binding award against a sovereign state.40 0 Most
other BITs between first-world capital-exporting state parties and
third-world capital-importing state parties provide the same
protection. 40 1 Although the Kurds living in the villages through
which the BTC pipeline will pass have no tribunal in which to seek
redress, private actors such as BP can bring binding arbitration
against any sovereign state with whom they have an investment
dispute, provided that state is a party to a bilateral investment
treaty ("BIT") with the United Kingdom.
There are currently over 2,000 BITs in existence. 42 Today
bilateral investment treaties are the "dominant international
vehicle through which investment is regulated. "' ° Negotiation of
these BITs has been one of the most active areas of public
international lawmaking since the 1 9 6 0 s. ° Under the standard
U.S. Model BIT, from which it accepts only small deviations in
actual negotiation, the definition of investment includes hard
investments, such as real estate, financial assets, contractual
property, as well as "any right conferred by law or contract, and
any licenses and permits pursuant to law."40 5 A breach of an
agreement between the host country and an American investor,
therefore, becomes a violation of international law.4°
The ability of a private party to impose binding legal
arbitration on a nation state, as provided in bilateral investment
treaties, is without doubt one of the most salient examples of how
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24
INT'L LAW. 655, 655 n. 3 (1990).
401. Eloisa Obadia, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
ICSID, Investment Treaties and Arbitration: Current and Emerging Issues
(Fall 2001), http://www.worldbank.org ticsid/news/news.htm (last visited Aug.
10, 2004).
402. Margrete Stevens, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
Arbitration and Investment Disputes - Are We Heading in the Right Direction?
(Spring 2002), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/news.htm (last visited

Aug. 10, 2004).
403. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L.
639, 640 (1998).
404. Salacuse, supra note 400, at 655.

405. Guzman, supra note 403, at 640.
406. Id. at 654.
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international law has evolved. If the Norms set forth the duties of
transnational corporations, then BITs most definitely provide for
their rights. Given the legal power and personality of these
private actors, it is not possible to make a straight-faced assertion
that international law is the subject only of states.
"Victims of human rights violations should not have to clear
more hurdles and accept more limited access to remedies than the
owners of intellectual property." 7 Under Article 18 of the Norms,
"[t]ransnational corporations... shall provide prompt, effective
and adequate reparation to those persons, entities and
communities... adversely affected by failures to comply with
these Norms through, inter alia, reparations, restitution,
compensation and rehabilitation for any damage done or property
taken."4"
Duty of reparation has been a standard duty of
international law since Grotius.4'" The ICJ in the Corfu Channel
case confirmed this.4 °
Prompt, effective and adequate reparation is the standard of

reparation owed by a host government who violates the property
rights of a United States corporation. 41 1 This standard essentially
restates the Hull Doctrine.4 "2 Capital-exporting countries long
413
considered the Hull rule to reflect customary international law
despite developing countries' assertions, including two General
Assembly resolutions, to the contrary.4 4 Germany, Switzerland,
Great Britain and other first-world countries continue to negotiate
similar or equal reparation standards in their BITs with
Simple justice and equity demand,
developing countries.
therefore, that the legal standard of reparation for international
407. Collingsworth, supra note 292, at 203.
408. Norms, supra note 1, at art. 18 (emphasis added).
409. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 19, at 622.
410. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 9 (Apr. 9).
411. Guzman, supra note 403, at 657.
412. See, e.g., id. at 645 (discussing the origin of this standard of reparation).
In response to Mexican agrarian and oil nationalization measures in 1938,
U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded prompt, adequate and effective
compensation for American property owners. Id.
413. Id. at 655-56.
414. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII),
U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1194th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc E/RES/62/1803 (1962)
(eighty-seven states voted in favor; 2 against, and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics abstained) [hereinafter 1962 Resolution]. Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess.,
2203d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc E/GEN/NRO/282/43 (1973) (One hundred-eight
states voted in favor, one against - Great Britain - and sixteen abstained essentially the developed world, including France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Japan and the United States) [hereinafter 1973 Resolution]. The
1962 Resolution provided that the standard of reparation be "adequate," a
term it did not define. 1962 Resolution, supra, at art. 4. The 1973 Resolution
provided that "each state is entitled to determine the amount of possible
compensation and the mode of payment." 1973 Resolution, supra, at art. 3.
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human rights violations evolve into the same standard as that of
international corporate property rights violations.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The transnational, or "polycorporate enterprise constitutes a
new form of enterprise organization where a plurality of separate
41 5
legal entities are submitted to a unitary economic direction."
The Norms provide a unitary body of human rights law, culled
from separate legal instruments, such as the U.N. Charter, the
International Bill of Rights, treaties, conventions, jus cogens
norms of customary international law, the writings of eminent
international jurists and United Nations General Assembly
416
resolutions codified in a plurality of legal documents.
Under the
rules of international law, some of these instruments carry more
weight than others, but together they set forth international law of
human rights, civil and political rights, employment rights and
environmental and health rights as it has evolved and exists
today. They are not mere assertions, nor is their context factually
or legally dubious.
Moreover, the Commentary to the Norms encourages other
stakeholders, such as trade unions, NGOs and industry groups to
use the Norms in their human rights oriented dealings with
transnational corporations.4
The Commentary further promotes
the Norms as benchmarks for ethical investment initiatives by
businesses as well as standards of compliance.4"8
The United Nations has established the unambiguous duty
of these intervening actors to obtain authorization for their actions
and to account to all those affected by their conduct. Despite gaps
and wrinkles regarding precise enforcement mechanisms and
procedures, the law is clear.
Transnational corporations
participate in the international arena more than most nation
states. They cannot act and intervene in this community and
simultaneously stay outside its norms and laws.
In international law it is well established that all parties need
to be rule oriented. It is equally well established amongst outlaws,
their lackeys and their victims that he who has the gold makes the
rules.

415.
416.
417.
418.

Antunes, supra note 129, at 208.
Norms, supra note 1, at pmbl.
Commentary, supra note 14, at art. 16 cmt. (c).
Id.

